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ACCORD AND SATISFACTIoN-LIQUIDATED CLAIAh-CoNsIDERATION.-GALo-
WITZ v. HENDLIN, I50 N. Y. Supp. 64I.-Held, where a demand was
liquidated and a smaller amount was accepted and a receipt in full given,
the receipt did not amount to an accord and satisfaction, the element of
consideration being wanting.
It is well settled that where a claim is unliquidated, or the amount
thereof is in dispute, a payment and acceptance of a less sum than the
claim in satisfaction is an accord and satisfaction. Wheeling v. Baker,
132 Mich. 5o7. The rule that payment of a smaller sum cannot be a
satisfaction of a liquidated sum is based on a dictum in Pennel's Case,
3 Coke's Reports, 117. The reason for the rule being lack of considera-
tion, courts have made exceptions to the rule wherever a technical con-
sideration can be shown to exist. And so an agreement to accept a less
sum secured, or differently secured, is held to be a good accord and
satisfaction. Kemmerer v. Kokendifer, 65 Ill. App. 31. A payment in
advance of a less sum than is due is considered to be a good considera-
tion to support an accord and satisfaction. Weiss v. Marks, 2o6 Pa. 513.
Acceptance by the creditor of the note of a third person in full satis-
faction of the debt extinguishes such debt, though the note is for a
less sum. Wipperman v. Hardy, 17 Ind. App. 142. The giving of a
check for less than claim has been held to be a payment in a medium
other than in what debtor was obliged to make and so constituted good
consideration for accord and satisfaction. American Seeding Mach.-Co.
v. Baker, 1O4 N. E. (Ind.) 524. But the acceptance of a check for a
less amount in full satisfaction, is not usually held to be a good accord
and satisfaction. National Art Co. v. Ellery, 145 N. Y. Supp. 277; Jordy
v. Maxwell, 56 So. (Fla.) 946. It has even been held that the payment
of a less sum at a place other than that contemplated by the parties
constitutes a good consideration for an accord and satisfaction. Harper
v. Graham, 2o Ohio iO5. A few states have repudiated the general rule
and hold that the payment of a less sum in full satisfaction of a greater
sum that is actually due is a good accord and satisfaction. Frye v.
Hubbell, 74 N. H. 358; Clayton v. Clark, 74 Miss. 499. And several states
have changed the general rule by statute and hold that the acceptance
of a smaller sum for a debt due is binding and effectual unless vitiated
by fraud. Bisbee v. Haun, 47 Me. 543. As to the effect of a receipt in
full, the principal case lays down the doctrine that is generally followed.
But a few states hold that where discharge of debt is evidenced by a
written receipt for the smaller sum in full satisfaction of the greater,
it is a binding release. Dreyfus v. Roberts, 75 Ark. 354; Aborn v.
Rathbone, 54 Conn. 444.
BILLS AND NOTES-NEGOTIATION-PAYEE AS HOLDER IN DUE COURSE.-
LONG V. SHAFER ET AL., 171 S. W. (Mo.) 69o.-Held, that the delivery
of a negotiable instrument to the payee is not a "negotiation" under
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the Negotiable Instruments Law, and such payee cannot therefore be a
"holder in due course" within the meaning of that law.
It was well settled prior to the Act that a payee receiving in good faith
and for value an instrument completed in the hands of the maker, was
protected against the defense of misappropriation by the intermediary.
Munroe v. Bodier, 8 C. B. 862; Sout- Boston Iron Co. v. Brown, 63
Me. 139. By the weight of authority the same protection was accorded
in the case of an instrument signed in blank and filled out contrary
to authority. Geddes v. Blackrnore, 132 Ind. 551; Humphreys v. Finch,
97 N. C. 303. Sometimes the payee was expressly held to be a "bona
fide holder for value" or "holder in due course." Moody v. Threlkeld,
13 Ga. 55; Weidman v. Symes, 120 Mich. 657. In other cases the doctrine
of estoppel was invoked. Jones v. Shelbyville Insurance Co., i Metc.
(Ky.) 58; Armstrong v. National Bank, 133 U. S. 433. A few cases held
the payee charged with notice of defenses owing to the fact that the
maker was a stranger. Bowles Co. v. Clark, 59 Wash. 336. Others
charged him with notice of defenses on the ground that he was an
immediate party. Burke v. Smith, iii Md. 624 (illegal consideration).
A few merely placed upon him the burden of proof of bona fides and
value. Nelson v. Cowing & Seymour, 6 Hill (N. Y.) 336. The Nego-
tiable Instruments Act limits its protection, in the case of instruments
improperly filled out, to a "holder in due course" to whom the instru-
ment has been "negotiated." Sec. 14. This has been held to exclude
the payee on the ground .that a negotiation, as distinguished from an
issue, means delivery from one holder to another. Vander Ploeg v.
Van Zunk, 135 Iowa 350. Cf. Herdmann v. Wheeler, (19o2) i K. B.
361 (similar provisions of English Bill of Exchange Act). Both lines
of authority just cited admit that the payee may become a "holder in
due course," though not within the protection of Sec. 14 owing to the
absence of a "negotiation." The effect of these holdings has been in
some degree neutralized in England by a reversion to the old doctrine of
estoppel. Lloyds Bank v. Cooke, (19o7) i K. B. 794. Far preferable is
the fully-established doctrine of Massachusetts, that the delivery of an
instrument to the payee is a negotiation, and that he may therefore be
within the rights of a holder in due course with reference to paper
filled out contrary to authority. Boston Steel & Iron Co. v. Stener, 183
Mass. 14o; Liberty Trust Co. v. Tilton, 217 Mass. 462. The presumption
in favor of their interpretation due to the previous state of authority,
is further strengthened by a comparison of Sec. 191, which expressly
includes the payee within the term "holder," with Sec. 3o, which defines
a negotiation as a "transfer from one person to another in such manner
as to constitute the transferee the holder thereof."
GUARDIAN AND WARD-CHILD'S ESTATE-PARENT'S BuRIAL EXPENSES.-
IN RE CONNOLLY'S ESTATE, 150 N. Y. SuPP. 559.-Held, where the
general guardian of a deceased infant paid the burial expenses of its mother
to save her from a pauper's grave, equity in consideration of the child's
legal and moral obligation will allow reimbursement to the guardian
out of his ward's estate.
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In the absence of statute, a child is under no legal obligation to sup-
port his parents though they may be destitute and infirm. Duffy v.
Yardi, 149 Cal. 14o; Edwards v. Davis, 16 Johns. 281; McCook County
v. Kamoss, 7 S. Dak. 558; Stone v. Stone, 32 Conn. 142. And no
promise on the part of the child to pay for necessaries furnished to the
parent will be implied from the mere fact of relationship. Stone v.
Stone, supra; Lebanon v. Griffin, 45 N. H. 558. It is the duty of a child
to provide suitable burial for a parent who dies in the child's household.
Robinson v. Blair, 3 Atl. (Pa.) 669. See Reg. v. Stewart, 12 A. & E. 773.
Likewise, if a person is under a legal duty to bury the deceased, as a
husband is under a legal duty to bury his wife, or an executor his
testator, and he fails to perform that duty, and some third person
performs that duty unofficiously, he may recover from the person legally
liable. Jenkins v. Tucker, i H. Bl. go; Chapple v. Coope, 13 M. & W.
252; Rogers v. Price, 3 Young & Jervis 28. Where A, an infant,
inherited property from M, her grandfather, and Y, the administrator of
M's estate, paid the funeral expenses of A, Y being a mere volunteer,
could not be reimbursed out of A's estate. Fay v. Fay, 43 N. J. Eq. 438.
The infant being under no legal duty to provide for her parents, the
guardian had no duty to perform toward them. Hence, it would seem
that h was a mere volunteer and not entitled to reimbursement out of
the infant's estate. The decision in the principal case seems questionable
on principle and the authorities cited do not seem to support it.
HoMICIDE-DuTY TO RETREAT.-PEOPLE v. ToMLINs, 107 N. E. (N. Y.)
496.-Held, where the defendant shot and killed his son in an alterca-
tion which took place on the porch of their dwelling house, the father
was not bound to retreat to avoid killing but had the right to stand his
ground and kill his assailant. Collin and Cuddeback, JJ., dissenting.
The general doctrine in England and this country that one must
"retreat to the wall" before killing in self-defence is of course qualified
by .the rule that there is no duty to retreat if the assault is made in
one's own home. Foster v. Territory, 6 Ariz. 240; Elder v. State, 69
Ark. 648; People v. Lewis, 117 Cal. 186. In People v. Newcomer, ii8
Cal. 263, the rule was applied even though the assailant was no tres-
passer. The case nearest the principal case is Jones v. State, 76 Ala. 8,
where defendant was held not bound to retreat before his partner where
the assault took place in their store. In Watkins v. State, 89 Ala. 82,
however, it was held defendant was bound to retreat from his yard
to his home. Contra, State v. Cushing, 14 Wash. 527. If one is
attacked while on his own premises by one in the highway, it is his
duty to retreat. State v. Rochester, 72 S. C. 194. (This case disapproved
the decision in State v. Bartlett, 59 L. R. A. (Mo.) 756, which extends
the rule of the principal case to a public street.) Contra, Kirk v. Terri-
tory, IO Okla. 46. One is bound to retreat from his home if he brought
on the trouble. Maxwell v. State, 129 Ala. 48. So if the defendant
voluntarily entered the fight or it was a mutual affray. Harris v.
People, 32 Colo. 211. The present is a case of first impression in New
York and not only adopts the doctrine that one need not retreat in
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one's own house but gives the rule a-more extreme application than
any previous case has done, in that it goes beyond Jones v. State, supra.
and extends to the killing of a son by his father.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-DEED BY HUSBAND TO SELF AND WIFE-STATE
CREATED.-WRIGHT ET AL. v. KNAPP ET AL., 15o N. W. (MicH.) 315.-Held,
that a deed of land by a husband to himself and wife jointly, and to
the survivor of them, creates, not a joint-tenancy nor a tenancy by the
entirety, but a tenancy in common, free from the incident of survivor-
ship. Brooke, C. J., and McAlvay, J., dissenting.
Under the common law theory of the unity of husband and wife,
neither could make a direct conveyance to the other. Rico v. Branden-
stein, 98 Cal. 465. On the same principle that one person cannot be both
grantor and grantee, it is generally held, wherever the law requires a
joinder of the husband in the conveyance by the wife, that the latter
cannot convey to her husband, although in the absence of such require-
ment, this conveyance would be good. Trawik v. Davis, 85 Ala. 342;
Alexander v. Shalala, 228 Pa. 297. Cf. Savage v. Savage, 18 Me. 472
(joinder not required). Accordingly it was agreed in the principal case
that the conveyance by the husband was void with respect to the grant
to himself. When one of two grantees in common is unable to take,
the other grantee receives only his moiety, the remainder lapsing to the
grantor. Bagwell v. Dry, i P. Win. 700; Matter of Kimberly, 15o N. Y.
go. But if the intention is to create a joint-tenancy, and one of two
grantees is unable to receive, the survivor takes the entire interest.
Buffar v. Bradford, 2 Atk. 220; Gardner v. Printup, 2 Barb. (N. Y.) 83.
Severance of the unity of title would in the latter case be inconsistent
with the intention expressed in the grant. 2 Bl. Com. i8o et seq. A
tenancy by the entirety appears in this respect to partake of the character
of a joint-tenancy. Sprinkle v. Spainhowe, 149 N. C. 223; McRoberts v.
Copeland, 85 Tenn. 21H. Contra, Wright v. Saddler, 2o N. Y. 322 (point
not discussed). Under the common law a conveyance to husband and
wife created a tenancy by the entirety. Wright v. Saddler, supra. By
the weight of authority this has not been altered by the statutes
removing the disabilities of married women. Pray v. Stebbins, 141 Mass.
219; Goodrich v. Village of Otego, i6o App. Div. (N. Y.) 349. Contra,
Clark v. Clark, 56 N. H. 105. Nor does the statutory presumption in
favor of a co-tenancy and against a joint-tenancy apply to grants to
husband and wife. Price v. Pestka, 54 App. Div. (N. Y.) 59; Wilson v.
Frost, 186 Mo. 311. Courts which dissent from this view would still
give effect to an unequivocal expression of intention to create a joint-
tenancy. Lawler v. Byrne, 252 Ill. 194. In one instance, under facts
similar to those of the principal case, full effect was given to the grant
in joint-tenancy, the technical difficulty as to conveyance to one's self
being ignored rather than surmounted. Saxon v. Saxon, 46 Misc. Rep.
(N. Y.) 2o2. Better supported is the view of the minority in the
principal case, that the wife, as surviving joint-grantee, takes the whole,
owing to the invalidity of the husband's grant to himself. The holding
of the majority is tantamount to the substitution of a new instrument
between the parties.
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INSURANCE-AsSIGNMENT OF POLICY-INSURABLE INTEREST-CRISMOND'S
ADM'X ET AL. V. JONES ET AL., 83 S. E. (VA.) 1o45.-Held, in a suit by
the next of kin of the insured, who had not assented to the assignment,
to recover the proceeds of a life insurance policy paid to the assignee,
that the assignee of a life insurance policy must have an insurable
interest in the life of the insured.
Most of the early cases on the subject held in accord with the
principal case that the assignee must have an insurable interest in the
life of the insured, on the ground that otherwise it became a wager
and a gambling contract, and would be likely to promote crime in
getting rid of the insured. It was therefore contrary to public policy.
Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Hazzard, 41 Ind. 116; Derney v. Hoffer, 11o
Pa. iog. As to the last argument, while it has weight in a case where
the beneficiary without an insurable interest takes out the policy him-
self, in such a case as this where the assignee selects the beneficiary
himself he will take care not to select one who will murder him. Con-
cerning the first argument, it is true that the assignment is in the
nature of a gambling contract but so is every insurance policy, and the
question is whether or not there are other beneficial considerations
which outweigh that fact. The common law has always favored aliena-
bility and tried to promote commercial value and usefulness, and on
these grounds modern authority tends to hold these assignments valid.
Fitsgerald v. Ins. Co., 56 Conn. 116; Martin v. Stublings, 126 Ill. 387;
St. John v. Am. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 13 N. Y. 31. The policy must have
been taken out in good faith by the insured or one having an insurable
interest and not merely as a cloak to procure insurance by a beneficiary
without insurable interest. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Frande, 94 U. S. 561.
But, if the transactions have been bona fide and value has been given,
the assignee, on grounds of commercial expediency, should be allowed
to recover the whole amount and not merely what he has paid in.
Mit. Life Ins. Co. v. Richards, 99 Mo. App. 88; Ruth v. Katterman,
112 Pa. 251. See Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U. S. 591. In
the case of voluntary assignments, the argument of commercial need
seems to fail but some jurisdictions hold that even a donee who has no
insurable interest takes a valid assignment. King v. Cram, 185 Mass.
io3; Stein Bach v. Diepenbrock, 158 N. Y. 24. The fact that a statute
had been passed in Virginia subsequent to this assignment providing
for the assignment of a policy for a valuable consideration without
regard to whether the assignee has an insurable interest or not, shows
the modern idea of the proper public policy. Virginia Acts I9O2-I9O4
p. 256; Code, sec. 2859a.
INSURANcE-FIRE POLICIES-CHANGE OF INTEREST.-WILEY v. LoNDoN
& LANCASHIRE FIrR INS. Co., 92 ATL. (CONN.) 678.-Held, that where a
fire policy provided that any change in the interest of the insured other
than by death should avoid it, the change which will avoid the policy
must result in an actual change in the insured's interest; and hence,
where the insured conveyed the property to a third person, who imme-
diately executed and delivered a re-conveyance, the whole purpose of
the transaction being to prevent attachment, the policy was not avoided.
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A condition in a fire insurance policy provided that any change in
the interest of the insured other than by death, is valid and not opposed
to public policy as in restraint of alienation. Findlay v. Ins. Co., 74 Vt.
211. The purpose of such a provision is to prevent any increase in the
risk assumed by the insurer, by decreasing the interest of the insured.
German Ins. Co. v. Gibe, 59 Ill. App. 614; Ayres v. Ins. Co., 17 Iowa
176. "If by a subsequent decrease in the value of his interest covered
by the policy the insured could, upon loss of his diminished interest,
recover the value of his original interest, the probability of fire would
undoubtedly be greater." Vance on Insurance, p. 449. Since the increase
in the risk caused the insertion of such a condition, the general rule
is that such immaterial changes of interest as do not diminish the
value of that interest or increase the risk are expected from the opera-
tion of the condition. Bemis v. Ins. Co., 14 Pa. Super. Ct. 528; Cone v.
Ins. Co., 139 Iowa 205. In the principal case there was at no time any.
diminution in the interest of the insured in watching or guarding the
property from fire, and hence no increase in the risk, and the case
clearly falls within the class of those excepted from the operation of
the condition.
LIBEL AND SLANDER-WORDS ACTIONABLE PER sE-DISPARAGEMENT OF
TRADE OR BusiNEss-QuALITY OF ARTICLES SOLD.-HoPKINS CHEMICAL
Co. v. READ DRUG & CHEMICAL Co., 92 ATL. (MD.) 478.-Held, defamatory
words concerning one's profession, trade or business are actionable
per se; but words in disparagement of articles one manufactures or sells
are not, unless they also contain an imputation upon the manufacturer.
Words spoken about a person in relation to his business, calculated to
injure him in that business, are actionable Per se. Arcnivici v. Salant,
146 N. Y. Supp. 527; Mengel v. Reading Eagle Co., 241 Pa. 367. Thus,
falsely to charge a person in business with bankruptcy is libellous per se.
Hynds v. Fourteenth Street Store, 144 N. Y. Supp. lO3O. But defamatory
words to be actionable per se must prejudice the one concerning whom
they are published in the special profession or-business in which he is
actually engaged. People's N. S. Bank v. Goodwin, 149 S. W. (Mo.
App.) 1148. Hence, words charging a doctor with having stolen land
of a certain person are not a slander with reference to his profession
so as to be actionable per se. Jones v- Bush, 131 Ga. 421. Nor is a
charge of insolvency actionable per se in favor of a school-teacher.
Darling v. Clement, 69 Vt. 292. But words written of a person's trade
or business may be libellous even when they might not be so if spoken
of the individual personally, for every publication which as a natural
result will cause pecuniary loss to a business man is a libel. Dobbin
v. Chicago, R. L & P. R. R., 138 S. W. (Mo. App.) 682. As to the second
point in the holding of the principal case, it has been held that a letter
published in a fruit growers' magazine stating that the writer had used
plaintiff's remedy for brown rot on peach trees with disastrous results
was not libellous per se since it only related to the quality of article
which the plaintiff manufactured and sold. Dust Sprayer Co. v. Western
Fruit Grower, 126 Mo. App. 139, 103 S. W. 566. To the same effect is
Victor Safe &' Lock Co. v. Deright, 77 C. C. A. (Neb.) 437.
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NEGLIGENE-TRIAL-INSTRUCTIONS-LANGUAGE.-DEVINE V. NORTHWEST-
ERN ELEVATED R. R., io' N. E. (ILL.) ii8.-Held, the words "due and
proper care and caution," "negligence," and "due and ordinary care,"
used in instructions to the jury, are not misleading and need not be
defined unless requested.
In negligence cases though the plaintiff may charge negligence in gen-
eral terms, yet the instructions submitting negligence to the jury must
be specific. Schaaf v. St. Louis Box Co., 14o S. W. (Mo. App.) 1197.
That is, the negligence charged in the instruction must be limited to
the negligence alleged in declaration. Presley v. Kinlock Telephone Co.,
158 Ill. App. 220; Smith v. Illinois Collieries Co., 155 Ill. App. 148.
The instruction must specify what the negligent acts were. Raybourn
v. Phillips, I4O S. W. (Mo. App.) 977; Clancy v. N. Y., N. H. & H.
R. R., 112 N. Y. Supp. 541. And it must not limit the necessity for the
exercise of ordinary care to the precise time when injury occurred.
Goldblatt v. Brocklebank, 166 Ill. App. 315. It must never make the
juror the standard of what is a prudent person. City of Americus v.
Johnson, 2 Ga. App. 378; 58 S. E. 518. As to the question whether the
court must define the word "negligence" or "ordinary care" in its
charge, there is some conflict of authority. Some cases hold that such
definition is not necessary. B. & N. 0. R. R. v. Barry, 98 Tex. 248;
Sweeney v. Kansas City R. R., 15o Mo. 385; O'Leary v. Kansas City,
127 Mo. App. 77. Others hold the contrary view. May v. Hahn, 22
Tex. Civ. App. 365; Covington Saw Mill Co. v. Drexilins, 12o Ky. 493.
In the case of Birmingham Light & Power Co. v. Jackson, 9 Ala. App.
588, 63 So. 782, it was held that the lower court erred in refusing to
define "wantonness" where the complaint charged "wantonness" and
there was evidence to sustain such charge. But it has been held that
it is not necessary to use the words "negligent" or "negligence" at
all where the instruction submits a series of acts amounting to negligence
as a matter of law and which directs the jury to find for the plaintiff
on finding that those acts were committed. Prash v. Wabash R. R.,
132 S. W. (Mo. App.) 57; Bolger v. Kansas City Material Co., 157
S. W. (Mo. App.) 87. As a practical matter it would seem that the
words "negligence" and "ordinary care" conveyed a definite enough
meaning to most minds to suffice without judicial definition.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANIES-PROPERTY-FRANCHISE.-PUBLIC SERVIcE
GAs Co. v. PUBLIC UTILITY ComRs ET AL., 92 Ar,. (N. J.) 6o6.-Held,
in determining the total valuation of a public service company to fix
the rate at which it must sell gas to enable it to earn a reasonable
income on its property, the franchise of the corporation must be included
in the property of the corporation. Walker, Ch. J., Trenchard, Kalisch,
and Terhume, J., dissenting.
Corporate franchises are, by the great weight of authority, property of
the corporation. New Orleans City etc. R. R. v. New Orleans, 143 U. S.
192; San Jos Gas Co. v. January, 57 Cal. 614; People v. Deehan, 153
N. Y. 528. Contra, Bank v. Hines, 3 Oh. St. I. Being property, it cannot
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be taken or impaired, even for a public use, without just compensation.
Coney Island etc., R. R. Co. v. Kennedy, 48 N. Y. Supp. 825; Wilmington
& W. R. Co. v. Reid, 13 Wall. 264. It is not property, however, which is
liable to seizure and sale. Stein v. Mobile, 17 Ala. 234. Contra, People
v. O'Brien, in N. Y. i. Neither does it pass to the general assignee for
creditors. Fertsom v. Hay, 122 Ill. 293. It is generally recognized that
corporate franchises are taxable by the common law or have been made
so by statute. Edison Electric Illmm. Co. v. Spokane, 22 Wash. 168;
New Orleans v. New Orleans etc. Co., 4o La. Ann. 587; Fond du Lac
Water Co. v. Fond du Lac, 82 Wis. 322. On principle, if the taxing power
has the right to tax the corporate franchise as property of the corpora-
tion, the corporation should in turn have the right to insist that the
franchise be reckoned as property in determining at what rate the
corporation must sell its gas in order to earn a fair income from its
property.
TELEGRApHS AND TELEPHONES-DEATH MESSAGES-MENTAL ANGUISH.-
ALSBROOK V. WESTERN UNION TEL. CO., i5o N. W. (IowA) 75.-Held,
delay in the transmission of a message announcing the death of plaintiff's
mother warrants recovery for mental anguish suffered by the addressee
because of the delay in reaching the place of the funeral and meeting
his relatives there as early as he would otherwise have done.
The usual damages recoverable in case of breach of contract are
limited to pecuniary and property loss and there can be no recovery
for mental anguish. Hall v. Jackson, 24 Colo. App. 225. A well-recog-
nized exception is the case of breach of contract to marry where damages
recoverable may include full compensation for the pain, mortification and
wounded feelings of the plaintiff. Liese v. Meyer, 143 Mo. 547. In the
case of torts, the general rule is that mental suffering can be recovered
for only when it is the result of bodily injury. Samarra v. Allegheny
Valley St. Ry. Co., 238 Pa. 469. But recovery may be had for mental
anguish in case of willful or wanton wrongs or those committed with
malice and intention to cause mental distress. Small & Co. v. Lonergan,
81 Kans. 48. The doctrine adopted by the principal case that recovery
may be had for mental anguish due to the neglect and delay of the death
message represents the minority view which was first promulgated in
Texas. So Relle v. Western Union Tel. Co., 55 Tex. 3o8; Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Crumpton, 138 Ala. 632. And a few jurisdictions have
expressly recognized this doctrine by statute. Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Shenep, 83 Ark. 476; Simmons v. W. U. Tel. Co., 63 S. C. 425. But in
order to render the telegraph company liable, the company must have
notice from the language of the message, or otherwise, that by reason
of its default, such damages would be likely to result. Williams v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 136 N. C. 82. The great weight of authority
is that there can be no recovery for mental anguish, where, due to the
telegraph company's negligence in delivering the message, the plaintiff
is prevented from seeing a near relative before death or from being
present at the funeral. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Halton, 71 Ill. App.
63; Austin v. Western Union Tel. Co., 42 N. Y. Supp. iog.
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WILLS-VESTED OR CONTINGENT ESTATES---"PAY OVER" RULE.-FuLTON
TRUST Co. OF NEW YORK V. PHILLIPS ET AL., 150 N. Y. SutP. 335.-Under
a will setting apart a moiety of an estate, and bequeathing the income
thereof to A, with direction to "pay over" the same to the children
of A after her decease and until their majority, and then to "pay over"
to them the principal, held, that the children of A acquired vested
and not contingent interests, and their legal representatives were entitled
to their portions, in the event of their death prior to that of A.
Dowling and Scott, JJ., dissenting.
By the "pay over" rule of interpretation, where the only donative
words in a will are contained in a direction to pay over a certain
interest to the legatee at a future time, the presumption is in favor of
a contingent and not a vested interest. In re Blake, 157 Cal. 448. In
the case of a beneficiary not ascertained at the time of the bequest,
this presumption is at its strongest. Seibert's Appeal, 19 Pa. St. 49.
The absence of words indicating a present vesting of interest is pre-
supposed in any application of the rule. Furmen v. Fox, I Cush.
(Mass.) 134. No question arises where the postponement in time is
expressly applied to the grant, and not merely to the payment. Hardy
v. Hardy, 174 Mass. 268. The presumption has been regarded as strength-
ened by a provision for the substitution of a second beneficiary in case
of the death of the first prior to the time of distribution. Clark v.
Cammann, i6o N. Y. 315. This, however, may at least equally well be
construed as vesting a remainder subject to a condition subsequent.
VanDyke v. Vanderpool, 14 N. J. Eq. i98; Crapo v. Price, 19o Mass.
317. Where the testator explicitly prescribes the manner in which the
executor is to make the distribution and determine the beneficiaries,
additional weight is given to the "pay over" presumption. Jones v.
Massey, 9 S. C. 376; Platt v. Platt, 42 Conn. 330. So, too, in case of
the insertion of a habendum clause relating directly and exclusively to
the "pay over" direction. In re Blake, supra. The presumption loses its
force when the postponement is merely for convenience in settling the
estate. Bowditch. v. Ayrault, 138 N. Y. 222; Crane v. Bolles, 49 N. J. Eq.
373. Similarly, when the postponement is merely for the purpose of
letting in an intermediary estate. Angus v. Noble, 73 Conn. 57; Van-
Dyke v. Vanderpool, supra. The presumption is weakened when the
direction is incorporated into the residuary clause, the purpose of which
is to avoid a partial intestacy. Armstrong v. Barber, 239 Ill. 389. So
also when the remainder is to the testator's own children. Gibbens v.
Gibbens, 14o Mass. lO2. The same is true when the disposition involves
the present severance of a moiety, the interest thereof being devoted
to those who are eventually to have the principal. Warren v,. Durant,
76 N. Y. 136. Cf. Smith v. Edwards, 88 N. Y. 92. The principal case
represents a reasonable extension of the consideration last named, to
apply where the principal and interest are to go, not to the same
individual, but to a single family branch.
